President Trump will travel to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE from 13 to 16 May – the first scheduled overseas visit of his second term, following his brief visit to the Vatican for Pope Francis’ funeral. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt has framed the visit as an opportunity to strengthen key regional partnerships. Talks are expected to focus on deepening trade and economic ties, signalling Washington’s readiness to encourage greater Gulf investment and reassert commercial influence in a region that is increasingly pivoting to Asia. Asia House’s Middle East Pivot to Asia report finds that China is now the Gulf’s largest trading partner and projects that Gulf-China trade is on track to overtake the Gulf’s trade with advanced Western economies by 2027, reflecting the growing importance of Asian markets to the Gulf.[1]

Looking back: The first Trump administration

Trump’s visit to Riyadh in 2017 upended the tradition of new presidents visiting North American or European allies first. His Saudi trip saw major trade and investment pledges, including US$450 billion from the Kingdom across US defence, energy, and infrastructure. It invigorated closer alignment between the Trump White House and key Gulf capitals, rooted in shared concerns over Iran and a mutually transactional approach to foreign policy with an emphasis on economic deliverables.

Closer US-Gulf coordination was hailed as a renaissance in ties and led to the Abraham Accords, a landmark series of normalisation agreements between Israel and several Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain.

As Trump prepares to return to the region in 2025, Gulf states will likely leverage his renewed engagement to expand their strategic economic ties with the US. The US and Asian economies are increasingly competing for Gulf investment and partnerships, reinforcing the region’s growing influence on the world stage. It is likely that Gulf states will see renewed US engagement as complementing rather than replacing growing ties with Asia.

The economics of engagement

The dominant theme of the trip is expected to be trade and investment. Since Trump’s election, Gulf economies have signalled a strong appetite to invest heavily in the US, and Trump will want this to be a central narrative of this trip. In January 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) pledged to expand the Kingdom’s investment and trade with the US by US$600 billion over the next four years. Trump has publicly urged the Kingdom to boost this to “around US$1 trillion”, targeting emerging technologies, infrastructure, and defence procurement.[2]

Following a high-level visit to Washington in March 2025 by UAE National Security Advisor and Chairman of multiple UAE sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE committed to a 10-year, US$1.4 trillion investment framework, targeting sectors such as AI infrastructure, semiconductors, energy and manufacturing.[3]

The Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum, taking place in Riyadh on 13 May, will likely provide a platform for deal-signing. US executives, including CEOs of BlackRock, Citigroup, Franklin Templeton, and IBM will be attending. The scene is set for a flurry of deals spanning energy, minerals, financial services, AI, technology, manufacturing, and defence industries.

Doha is also expected to expand its investments in the US, particularly in logistics, financial services, and technology. With its ambitions to become a regional digital hub, Qatar may use this moment to strengthen ties with leading US technology firms.

New US tariffs introduced under Trump are being met with pragmatism rather than retaliation in the Gulf. The direct impact on Gulf economies is limited. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for example, face the baseline 10 per cent tariffs on non-oil exports, with crude oil exempt. Exporting relatively little to the US, they have little incentive to retaliate, although the tariffs remain politically sensitive. This measured response reflects the region’s broader strategy – to preserve strong US ties while continuing their long-term pivot to Asia. Still, Trump may link tariff reductions to securing Gulf investment deals.

What does this mean for the Middle East Pivot to Asia?

Trump’s Gulf visit unfolds against the backdrop of a broader Middle East Pivot to Asia – an eastward shift in the region’s economic centre of gravity. This shift – driven largely by Asia’s energy needs and the Gulf’s diversification strategies – alongside Trump’s return to the region raises the question as to whether Trump’s renewed engagement will rebalance the trend.

In recent years, Gulf economies have strategically balanced between East and West. Looking westwards, deep historical ties and recent engagement, especially in defence and technology, gives Gulf leaders reason to continue valuing the US as a vital economic and security partner with competitive advantages. The UAE’s G42 partnership with Microsoft – which included a US$1.5 billion investment and the divestment of Chinese assets in favour of the deal – is an example of a Gulf state’s decision to deepen US ties even at the expense of Beijing. Gulf SWFs, including Saudi Arabia’s PIF and the UAE’s Mubadala and ADIA, are deeply embedded in US financial markets and increasingly focused on importing US technology into regional innovation ecosystems. Trump, for his part, is eager to position the US as a major commercial stakeholder in the Gulf. Trump’s push to welcome Gulf investment is met with interest as Gulf investors want access to US technology and innovation. 

Looking eastwards, the Middle East Pivot to Asia is unlikely to reverse, and in fact may continue at an accelerated rate despite renewed US-Gulf engagement. Gulf countries have become adept at aligning with Washington, Beijing, and other Asian capitals. China remains the Gulf’s largest trade partner. Gulf leaders likely view this as a balancing strategy to maximise economic opportunity and hedge against over-reliance on any single partner. For example, Chinese telecom giant Huawei, while banned in the US, continues to integrate its 5G networks across the GCC, despite US security concerns. Saudi Arabia’s Prosperity7 Ventures also invested in China’s Zhipu AI last year.[4] Beyond technology, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have welcomed Chinese partnership in sectors like construction, ports, and energy.

Beyond deals: Strategic opportunities

Energy remains a pillar of US-Gulf relations. While fossil fuels continue to dominate trade flows, Gulf states’ diversification strategies include green hydrogen, carbon capture, and solar megaprojects. US firms are well-positioned as partners, offering technology, project finance, and operational expertise.

Technology and digital infrastructure are emerging as focal points. AI is expected to feature prominently in Trump’s discussions, with both sides looking to scale cooperation. The US will seek greater Gulf investment into its technology sector, while Gulf states will want greater access to advanced semiconductors in exchange. Since October 2023, GCC countries have been classified as Tier 2 nations under the US’ AI diffusion rule restricting access to advanced chips, including by Nvidia. US willingness to ease export controls, particularly on advanced semiconductors, could be a key variable in how technology ties deepen.

In defence, Trump is likely to renew or expand arms sales agreements with Gulf allies, reinforcing security cooperation that has long underpinned the relationship. The US has reportedly given initial approval to sell US$3.5 billion worth of air-to-air missiles for Saudi fighter jets.[5] A new round of US weapons sales, potentially worth over US$100 billion, is reportedly in the pipeline.[6] At the same time, Gulf states are seeking technology transfers to build indigenous capabilities, creating opportunities for joint ventures.

A high-stakes regional agenda

Trump’s Gulf return comes amid a complex regional backdrop, including US-Iran relations. Trump withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and the new administration is currently engaged in indirect nuclear negotiations with Iran, with Oman serving as mediator. These talks are aimed at regional stability and containment, rather than the “maximum pressure” that marked Trump’s first term. The regional picture has since shifted. A Chinese-brokered détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic ties, which could temper Gulf alignment with a US hardline strategy.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has expanded its role as a mediator. In March 2025, the Kingdom hosted ceasefire discussions on the Russia-Ukraine war, positioning itself as an emerging backchannel broker in global affairs. This development may raise Saudi Arabia’s relevance to Washington as a trusted interlocutor.

Israel-Saudi normalisation continues to be a prize for Trump, though Saudi Arabia holds firm on its long-stated position of no normalisation without a viable Palestinian state.

Implications and outlook

Trump’s 2025 Gulf tour underscores a concerted US effort to re-anchor itself economically in a region where the balance of power is shifting eastwards. The scale of proposed investments highlights a mutual interest in deepening ties across key sectors, from technology to critical minerals, financial services, and defence. However, execution will be essential. Without meaningful follow-through, large headline figures risk being dismissed as political theatre. 

While the durability and mutual benefit of the economic partnerships forged over Trump’s visit remain to be seen over the longer run, the size and sector-focus of the deals announced will shed light on the extent of deepening US-Gulf economic ties. Trump’s trip could lay the foundations for a more resilient and diversified economic relationship.

The Gulf states will likely leverage Trump’s engagement to supplement, rather than supplant, their Asian partnerships, striving for balance. The Gulf’s strategic landscape is shifting, but it is expanding rather than realigning. Both the US and Asian players are vying for Gulf partnerships, which, in turn, is spurring the region’s growth as a global crossroads for capital and commerce.

*Picture reproduced under Creative Commons licence.